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Abstract—Nowadays, advanced security mechanisms exist to 
protect data, systems, and networks. Most of these mechanisms 
are effective, and security experts can handle them to achieve a 
sufficient level of security for any given system. However, most 
of these systems have not been designed with focus on good 
usability for the average end user. Today, the average end user 
often struggles with understanding and using security 
mechanisms. Other security mechanisms are simply annoying 
for end users. As the overall security of any system is only as 
strong as the weakest link in this system, bad usability of IT 
security mechanisms may result in operating errors, resulting 
in insecure systems. Buying decisions of end users may be 
affected by the usability of security mechanisms. Hence 
software providers may decide to better have no security 
mechanism then one with a bad usability. Usability of IT 
security mechanisms is one of the most underestimated 
properties of applications and systems. Even IT security itself 
is often only an afterthought. Hence, usability of security 
mechanisms is often the afterthought of an afterthought. 
Software developers are missing guidelines on how to build 
security mechanisms with good usability for end users. This 
paper presents some guidelines that should help software 
developers to improve end user usability of security-related 
mechanisms, and analyzes common applications based on these 
guidelines.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Any improvement of the overall security level of any 
system requires to improve the security level of all 
subsystems and available mechanisms as the overall security 
level of a system is determined by the weakest link in this 
system [12]. Howe et al. found that current software and 
approaches for security are not adequate for end users, 
because these mechanisms are missing ease of use [10]. Arce 
identifies the end user as weakest link in a company [12].  
Hence, improving the usability of security mechanisms helps 
to improve the overall security level of a system.  
Examples of bad usability of security mechanisms are all 
around. Bad usability of security mechanisms may slow 
down the adoption of a security system. This happened for 
example with email encryption. Today, it is very unlikely 
that an average user uses email encryption. Major problems 
for average users are key exchange and trust management, 
both having a very bad usability in common email 
encryption solutions. Figure 1 shows a completely useless 
error message during the generation of a key pair for email 
encryption as one example of bad usability.  
 
 
Figure 1. Error message during generation  
of a key pair for email encryption 
 
The use of email encryption in companies shows that an 
improved usability may lead to the adoption of the formerly 
despised technology. In companies, key exchange and trust 
management are usually not done by the users themselves,  
but they can rely on central infrastructures such as a central 
company directory with keys that are trusted by default (all 
employees). Such a directory ensures average users can use 
email encryption.  
The example of email encryption shows that designing 
security mechanisms with good usability is worth an effort. 
For the ordinary software developer, i.e., non security expert, 
it makes sense not to implement core security mechanisms 
like encryption algorithms or signature algorithms. Those 
mechanisms are usually available in security libraries written 
by security experts and could be easily used by software 
developers. However, software developers often decide on 
how security mechanisms are integrated into an application. 
For example, when implementing an email encryption 
security solution like GPGMail [11], the software developer 
decides on the interfaces for setting up trust and importing 
keys. Both mechanisms are application specific, hence must 
be implemented by the application developers. Usually, these 
functionalities are exposed to the users, hence should have a 
good usability. This paper presents some guidelines that 
should help software developers to improve end user 
usability of security-related mechanisms. To underline the 
importance of the presented guidelines, weaknesses of 
security mechanisms in common applications regarding 
usability for end users are shown in an analysis of common 
applications and security mechanisms on basis of the 
presented guidelines. 
Other important aspects of software security, e.g., secure 
coding guidelines, testing of security, and threat analysis are 
out of scope of this paper. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
gives an overview on related work. Section 3 presents 
guidelines for usable IT security mechanisms. Section 4 
analyzes the usability of some common security mechanisms 
and applications. Section 5 concludes the paper and gives an 
outlook on future work. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several standards focusing on usability in general exist, 
e.g., EN ISO 9241 [2]. In EN ISO 9241-11, which is part of 
EN ISO 9241, requirements for the usability of system are 
described. These requirements include effectiveness, 
efficiency and satisfaction. EN ISO 9241-10, another part of 
EN ISO 9241, lists requirements for usable user dialogs. 
However, the rules of EN SIO 9241 are very general and not 
targeted on security mechanisms. The design guidelines 
presented in this paper interpret the general requirements and 
rules of EN ISO 9241 and its parts for the special case of 
security mechanisms. 
Other publications like [3][4][5][6][7] focus on the 
usability of security mechanisms in special applications (e.g., 
email encryption), or focus on the usability of special 
security mechanisms (e.g., use of passwords). The guidelines 
presented in this paper are more general such that they are 
useful for the design of a wide variety of applications and 
security mechanisms.  
Markotten shows how to integrate user-centred security 
engineering into different phases of the software 
development process [1]. However, the emphasize of 
Markotten’s work is more on integration of usability 
engineering into the software development process than on a 
design guide. 
To summarize, previous works either are not focused on 
usability of IT security at all or are focused on one special 
aspect of usable IT security. A set of guidelines for software 
developers to consider during design of an application is 
missing. This paper presents some guidelines for software 
developers to help them improve the usability of security-
related functionality. 
III. GUIDELINES FOR GOOD USABILITY OF SECURITY 
MECHANISMS 
The  guidelines presented in this section are the result of 
several years in teaching IT security to beginners (and seeing 
their difficulties) as well as industrial experience in the 
design of products requiring IT security mechanisms that are 
operated by end users. The guidelines reflect our viewpoint 
on usability of security mechanisms. It is not assumed that 
those guidelines are complete.  It is important to notice that 
the usability of any system depends on the specific user and 
his experiences, knowledge and context of use, which 
includes the task at hand, the equipment at hand, and the 
physical and social environment of the user. Hence, it is hard 
to objectively evaluate the usability of a system. However, 
we hopes that the following set of nine design guidelines 
coming from the field may be of help for software 
developers: 
 
G1 Understandability, open for all users: As this paper 
focuses on usability for end users, the average end users 
should be able to use the security mechanism. Otherwise, the 
security mechanism is not useful for the intended audience. 
The average user neither has a special interest in IT security 
nor understands IT security. It is the responsibility of the 
software developer to hide as many security mechanisms as 
possible from the user. For those security mechanisms that 
are exposed to the end user it is necessary to get security 
awareness. The process of educating people is easier if 
suitable metaphors are used. A good metaphor is taken from 
everyday life of the average user, and is easy to grasp. A 
good metaphor is simple but powerful in its meaning. 
Example: an email encryption application should not use the 
term “encrypted email”. It is better to talk about a “secret 
message for xy” or “email readable only by xy” where xy is 
the receiver of the message. 
Usable security should be available for all users. It 
should especially not discriminate people. For example,  
usable security mechanisms should not exclude disabled 
people that use special tools to access applications (e.g., 
Braille reader for vision impaired people). Example of 
compliance with G1: if captchas are used in an application, 
multiple versions of the captcha should exist. Each version of 
the captcha should address another sense. 
 
G2 Empowered users: Ideally, a usable security 
mechanism should not be used to restrict the user in what he 
is doing or what he wants to do. This allows end users to 
efficiently fulfill their tasks. Efficiency is one of the general 
usability requirements of EN ISO 9241 [2]. The absence of 
user restrictions often results in a better acceptance of 
security by users. The focus of a security mechanism should 
be on protecting the user. Any security-motivated restriction 
of the user should be carefully evaluated regarding necessity 
for system security and adequateness. The user should at 
least have the impression that he is in control of the system 
and not the system is controlling him. Security mechanisms 
should interfere with the usual flow of user activities in the 
least possible way. Security mechanisms should allow the 
user to execute activities in any way he wants. Other drivers 
than protecting the user and the system should not be 
motivation for restrictions. Especially, users should not be 
restricted by a security mechanism for the only reason of 
copyright protection or other business reasons. While such 
security mechanisms are of great use for businesses, they 
constantly restrict the user, hence force him to bypass 
security mechanisms. As users are very imaginative in 
bypassing unwanted restrictions, it is very likely that a non-
security-motivated restriction decreases the security level of 
a system. The Apple iPhone is a good example: as the phone 
enforces many restrictions, many user bypass the security 
mechanisms by using a jailbreak software to revoke those 
restrictions.  
Another important rule is that the user should decide on 
trust relations. A security mechanism should not enforce 
trust relations given by a software vendor. The user should 
always have the possibility to revoke preinstalled trust 
relations. Trust relations should only be established in 
advance for the purpose of IT security. For example, having 
a preinstalled certificate to verify software patches is OK. 
Establishing trust relations out of business purposes should 
be avoided. Example of compliance with G2: applications 
should haven an interface that lists preinstalled certificates. 
The user should have the possibility to revoke certificates 
and install custom certificates.  
 
G3 No jumping through hoops: Users should only be 
forced to execute as little tasks as possible that exist only for 
IT security reasons. Otherwise, users get annoyed and refuse 
collaboration with IT security mechanisms. The ideal 
security mechanism does not interfere with user tasks at any 
time (also see G2). An example on how to not design 
security mechanisms are captchas: the user is forced to read a 
nearly unreadable and meaningless combination of letters 
and numbers and enter it before he can execute the wanted 
task. Example of compliance with G3: an application that 
uses a challenge-response mechanism similar to hashcash [9] 
instead of a captcha to avoid abuse of a service by automated 
scripts. 
 
G4 Efficient use of user attention and memorization 
capability: Users have problems memorizing data that does 
not belong to their social background. Hence, they tend to 
use all kind of optimization to reduce the amount of data 
they have to remember. This is why users only use 
approximately 3-4 passwords for all logins where they need 
passwords. Given the inflationary use of logins in web 
applications, it is very likely that an average user uses his 
passwords on multiple sites or for multiple purposes (e.g., for 
login, for encryption, …). But not only does an average user 
use the same password more than once, he also selects easy 
to remember passwords as he is not good in memorizing 
passwords with a mix of upper and lower case letters, 
numbers and special characters. Hence, security mechanisms 
should require the user only to remember little data or no 
data at all. Example of compliance with G4: An application 
uses an existing account from another site for login, e.g., by 
using OpenID [8]. The user can use an existing account, 
hence does not have to remember another password. 
Security mechanisms should only require as little 
interaction with the user as possible. The security mechanism 
should only requests the attention of the user if it is 
absolutely necessary. Interaction with the user should be 
done in the most minimalistic way. See also G1 for user 
interaction. Example of compliance with G4: an email 
encryption application that does not ask a user for each mail 
if he wants to encrypt the mail or not. Instead, the email 
application offers a configuration option to always encrypt 
mails. Additionally, the email composition window clearly 
states the current protection status and offers a possibility to 
override the preferences. 
 
G5 Only informed decisions: A user only feels secure 
and cooperates with a system if the system does not ask too 
much of him. Hence, users should only have to make 
decisions they can decide on. If there is an important security 
decision to take, it must be ensured that the user has the 
capability to make this decision. This means that the user has 
enough information about the situation that requires him to 
make a decision, and it must be ensured that the average user 
is capable to make an informed decision on this issue. If it is 
not clear if the user can decide on an issue, the decision 
should be avoided. G5 is hard to achieve and requires a 
careful examination during the design of an application. 
 
 G6 Security as default: Good usability requires 
efficiency. Hence, the user should not have to configure 
security when he first starts an application. Software for end 
users should always come preconfigured such that the 
software is reasonable secure and usable. All security 
mechanisms of a system should be delivered to the end user 
with a configuration that offers adequate security for the end 
users. The configuration effort must be minimized for users. 
This requires an analysis of the security requirements of 
average users during software development prior to the 
deployment of the software to find the adequate security 
level for most users. Example of compliance with G6: a 
home wifi access point comes preconfigured with a random 
WiFi password.  
 
G7 Fearless System: The security system should support 
a positive attitude of the user towards the security system. A 
user with a positive attitude towards security mechanisms is 
cooperative and more likely to not feel interrupted by 
security mechanisms. Hence, security mechanisms should 
protect the overall system in a way that the user neither has 
fear when the system is in a secure state nor feels secure 
when the system is not in a secure state. The security state of 
the system should be visible at all times. A security 
mechanism should be consistent in its communication with 
its user. A security mechanism should not use fear to force 
users to obey security policies or get a wanted reaction. G7 is 
hard to achieve and requires a careful examination during the 
design of an application. 
 
G8 Security guidance, educating reaction on user 
errors: Users tend to make mistakes, especially in respect to 
IT security. It is important that the security system hinders 
the user to make mistakes. However, as blocked operations 
can be very frustrating for users, the response of the security 
system must provide information why a given operation was 
blocked and should also offer a solution on how the user 
could proceed. The solution must be adapted on the situation 
and should keep the overall security of the system in mind. A 
security system should guide the user in the usage of security 
mechanisms. Errors should be prevented and there should be 
ways to “heal” errors. Example of compliance with G8: 
when an email encryption application fails to encrypt an 
email because of a missing public key of the recipient, the 
error message should explain how to import certificates from 
and how to verify certificates by comparing fingerprints of 
keys. To “heal” the error, the email encryption application 
offers to send the mail as password-protected PDF and 
instruct the user to call the recipient and tell him the 
password for the PDF. 
 
G9 Consistency: Consistency allows users to efficiently 
fulfill their tasks. Security mechanisms should fit into both 
the application and the system context where they are used. 
Security mechanisms should have the look and feel the user 
is used to. G9 is hard to achieve and requires a careful 
examination during the design of an application. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE USABILITY OF COMMON SECURITY 
MECHANISMS AND APPLICATIONS 
In this section common applications and security 
mechanisms are analyzed on basis of the guidelines given in 
Section III. The analysis identifies room for improvement in 
these applications and security mechanisms. It also shows 
some good examples for certain aspects of security 
usability. 
A. E-Mail Encryption using GPGMail 
The encryption process itself is fairly easy, usually 
requiring one click to enable email encryption. However, 
key and trust management requires significant effort. For a 
secure exchange of public keys, the user has to get the 
public key itself (e.g., from a key server or the homepage of 
the receiver of a message) and verify the authenticity of the 
key. Certificates may be in use. The authentication requires 
the use of another channel to communicate with the key 
owner (e.g., telephone or in person) and to read a number to 
the owner that is meaningless for the user. There is no 
guidance for this process. Then, the user has to change the 
trust of the exchanged public key. It gets more complicated 
when using a web of trust for trust management: for the web 
of trust to work, the user must decide on how trustworthy a 
person is to verify public keys/certificates in addition to 
managing direct trust into keys. The distinction between 
those different types of trust is very hard to understand for 
average users.  
 
This application is compliant with the following 
guidelines:  
• G2 (user decides on trust relations) 
• G4 (minimal interaction) 
• G7 (does not frighten user) 
• G9 (usually good integration, depends on system, 
mail client) 
 
This application is not compliant with the following 
guidelines:  
• G1 (hard to understand trust management and 
process of key verification) 
• G3 (complicated trust management) 
• G5 (hard to understand trust management and 
process of key verification) 
• G6 (not set to “encrypt all” by default) 
• G8 (not much guidance with trust management) 
 
B. Forced Updates 
Keeping a system up-to-date requires a timely use of 
provided security patches. However, many users are quite 
lax in applying security patches. Hence, nowadays more and 
more software providers let not the users decide on when to 
patch a system but automatically apply security patches as 
soon as available. While this relieves the user from applying 
patches, it does not take into consideration the situation of 
the user at the moment of a forced update. The update 
process may require downloading a large amount of date. 
This is a problem when the user is temporary on a low-
bandwidth connection. The update process may change 
security or trust relevant configuration of the application, 
e.g., by revoking certificates or adding new certificates that 
are considered trustworthy by the software provider. Often, 
forced updates cannot be stopped by the user, hence hinder 
the user.  
 
This security mechanism is compliant with the 
following guidelines:  
• G1 (easy to understand) 
• G5 (no user decisions involved) 
• G6 (keeps system up-to-date) 
• G7 (does not frighten user) 
• G8 (no user action necessary (or possible)) 
• G9 (well integrated) 
 
This security mechanism is not compliant with the 
following guidelines:  
• G2 (user can not decide to not apply a patch, user 
can not decide on time to apply patch (e.g., do not 
patch presentation application before presentation 
on CENTRIC 2012)) 
• G3 (in some cases user has to wait until patch was 
applied) 
• G4 (full attention of the user when waiting for 
process to finish) 
 
C. Captchas 
A captcha is a security mechanism avoiding that services 
are used by automated scripts. In theory, a captcha should 
be designed in a way that only humans can solve the given 
problem. Common captcha design requires users to read a 
distorted and meaningless combination of letters and 
numbers and enter it before he can use the service. Figure 2 
shows a captcha that is even worse from a usability point of 
view. Another side effect of the use of captchas is that 
captchas usually discriminate against disabled people (e.g., 
vision impaired people). 
  
Figure 2. Complicated captcha 
 
This security mechanism is compliant with the 
following guidelines:  
• G5 (no user decision needed) 
• G6 (always used) 
• G7 (does not frighten user) 
• G8 (gives instructions on how to use it) 
 
This security mechanism is not compliant with the 
following guidelines:  
• G1 (discriminates against disabled people) 
• G2 (does not allow users to use automation tools) 
• G3 (additional task without value for the user) 
• G4 (unnecessary user interaction) 
• G9 (many different kinds of captchas are in use) 
D. HTTPS Certificate Validation in Common Browsers 
HTTPS allows for confidential and integrity protected 
communication on the web. For example, HTTPS is used 
for online banking or shopping. Nowadays HTTPS is 
widely used on the web. However, for a secure 
communication it is necessary to avoid man-in-the-middle 
attacks. To do so, certificates are used to authenticate the 
web site that one communicates with. As it is not practicable 
to install a certificate for each and every web site one visits, 
most common browsers come with preinstalled certificates 
of so-called Certificate Authorities (CAs). A browser 
accepts all certificates that have been signed by such a CA. 
For example, Mozilla Firefox version 14.0.1 comes with 
over 70 preinstalled CA certificates. The browser software 
developer decides on the trustworthiness of a CA (and hence 
on the trustworthiness of web sites), not the end user.  
  
Figure 3 shows a typical error message of Firefox when 
encountering a certificate signed by an unknown CA. The 
text of this error message is too complicated for average 
users. Above this, average users are not capable of deciding 
on the validity of unknown certificate anyway. As this error 
often occurs, the users get used to it and usually just add a 
security exception to the system to access the web site, 
bypassing the security mechanism. Adding a security 
exception involves multiple steps (see Figure 4 for a 
screenshot of the second page of the error message when 
clicking on “Add Exception”. 
 
 
Figure 3. Typical error message of Firefox when encountering an unknown 
certificate 
 
 
Figure 4. Second dialogue page if user clicked  
"Add Exception" 
 
This security mechanism is compliant with the 
following guidelines:  
• G6 (large number of preinstalled CAs for secure 
communication) 
• G8 (guidance is given, however the texts used are 
not suited for average users) 
 
This security mechanism is not compliant with the 
following guidelines:  
• G1 (hard to understand error message given when 
browser encounters an unknown certificate / a 
certificate from an unknown CA) 
• G2 (many preinstalled CA certificates, the user 
does not initially decide on trust relations. 
However, expert users can change the trust 
settings) 
• G3 (annoying additional tasks when unknown 
certificate / a certificate from an unknown CA is 
encountered) 
• G4 (error unknown certificate happens often, hence 
most users simply ignore the message and add a 
security exception) 
• G5 (no informed decision possible) 
• G7 (error message unknown certificate implies an 
ongoing attack) 
• G9 (look and feel is not consistent with the rest of 
the browser) 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presented guidelines for software developers 
to improve the usability of security-related mechanisms. 
The analysis of security mechanisms in common 
applications showed weaknesses in the usability of security-
related mechanisms as well as good examples of security 
usability.  
Future work will include the design of usable security 
mechanisms for common problems, e.g., certificate handling 
and trust management as well as a user satisfaction study on 
the effectiveness of the guidelines. The applicability of the 
guidelines will be checked with software developers that are 
no security experts. The guidelines presented in this paper 
are focused on usability for the end user. Future design 
guides will also focus on better usability for other groups, 
e.g., system administrators, testers, and developers. 
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